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JOHN STUART MILL AND POLITICAL CORRECTNESS
Lackland H. Bloom, Jr.*
"For a long time past, the chief mischiefof the legal penalties is that they
strengthen social stigma. It is that social stigma which is really effective,
and so effective is it, that the profession of opinions which are under the
ban of society is much less common in England, than is, in many other
countries, the avowal of those which incur risk ofjudicialpunishment.

"

... Our merely social intolerance kills no one, roots out no opinions, but
induces men to disguise them, or to abstainfrom any active effort for their
diffusion... [T]he price paidfor this sort of intellectualpacification, is the
sacrifce of the entire moral courage of the human mind.

This is merely a small excerpt from John Stuart Mill's argument that
social stigmatization of unpopular speech does as much harm to the values
of freedom of speech as legal prohibition. Although the term did not then
exist in 1859, Mill was quite familiar with the notion of political
correctness, or as he would have put it social intolerance, and was very
concerned about its impact. As a philosopher writing in mid-nineteenth
century England, Mill was not addressing the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution. Rather he was concerned with speech as a
philosophical or political concept. Was Mill correct? Does private or
socially imposed censorship do as much if not more harm to the values
underlying freedom of speech as government censorship? If so, what if
anything should be done about it?
This article will examine Mill's arguments in favor of unrestrained
freedom of speech and his objection to the social censorship of speech. It
will then discuss the origins and impact of what is now characterized as
political correctness. The article will then define the concept of social
censorship and attempt to distinguish pure social censorship from private
tangible punishment of speech. Next, the article will examine the ways in
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which social censorship serves important social goals and promotes free
speech, as well as the ways in which it undermines free speech. It will
especially focus on the damage to intellectual autonomy and development
that so troubled Mill. The article will consider how the struggle between
freedom of speech and social censorship/political correctness is ultimately a
battle over the social norm defining the boundary between socially
acceptable and unacceptable speech focusing on how social norms,
especially in the area of speech, are created, maintained, and adjusted.
Finally, the article will explain how Mill's norm of a robust culture of free
speech can be defended and preserved against attempts at restriction.
Mill was a philosopher of legendary reputation as well as one of the
patron saints of freedom of speech. As such, there is a voluminous literature
on Mill and his theories.2 This article will summarize Mill's views on the
value of freedom of speech, as well as the harm to those values caused by
social censorship, to a large extent in Mill's own words. It will then attempt
to employ Mill's critique to issues that have arisen over a century and one
half after Mill wrote. It will attempt to focus on what Mill plainly said and
then apply Mill's words and thoughts to a context that is both similar and
yet very different. In so doing, it hopes, to the extent possible, to avoid the
never-ending and contentious debate over what Mill "really meant," as well
as speculation as to what John Stuart Mill himself would think and say if
transported to the twenty-first century. In other words, the assumption is
that Mill's ideas as they appear on the page can be separated from Mill the
man and his historical context.
I. JOHN STUART MILL ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND SOCIAL CENSORSHIP

Chapter Two of Mill's classic On Liberty titled "Of Liberty of Thought
and Discussion" provides a lengthy and vigorous defense of freedom of
speech.' In a few important paragraphs midway through the essay, Mill
argued that non-legal censorship does as much if not more harm to the
underlying values of freedom of speech and thought as legal regulation.'

2 See, e.g., JOHN GRAY, MILL ON LIBERTY: A DEFENCE
(1996); JOSEPH HAMBURGER, JOHN
STUART MILL ON LIBERTY AND CONTROL (1999); GERTUDE HTMMELFARB, ON LIBERTY AND
LIBERALISM: THE CASE OF JOHN STUART MILL (1974); RICHARD REEVES, JOHN STUART MILL
VICTORIAN FIREBRAND (2007); JOHN RILEY, MILL ON LIBERTY (1998); MILL'S ON LIBERTY: CRITICAL
ESSAYS (Gerald Dworkin ed., 1997); ALAN RYAN, J.S. MILL (1970); GEOFFREY SCARRE, MILL'S ON
LIBERTY (2007); JOHN SKORUPSKI, JOHN STUART MILL (1989) [hereinafter JOHN SKORUPSKI, MILL];
JOHN SKORUPSKI, WHY READ MILL TODAY? (2006); C.L. TEN, MILL ON LIBERTY (1980).

MILL, supra note 1, at 86-120.

Id. at 141-47.
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Mill defended vigorous and unrestrained freedom of speech from both a
social and individual perspective. From the former perspective, he argued
that free speech was essential to society's continual search for truth.' From
the latter perspective, he argued that free speech was essential to the
individual's ability to develop as an autonomous thinker.'
Throughout the essay, Mill emphasized the importance of free speech in
the continual search for truth. He observed that history has shown that
"many opinions, now general, will be rejected by future ages."' Suppression
8
of purportedly false speech assumes unwarranted infallibility in the censor.
As such, banishing any matter whatsoever from the domain of free debate
presumes an unwarranted certainty. Moreover, a "clearer perception and
livelier impression of truth [is] produced by its collision with error."' Thus
society benefits from even the dissemination of false speech.
Perhaps as, if not more important to Mill than the societal benefit from
the discovery of truth, was the enriching of the intellect derived from the
search itself. An individual can arrive at the truth only by continually
"correcting and completing his own opinion."10 Thus for Mill, it was
impossible to know the truth in the absence of rigorous, critical, and
constant examination and reexamination of premises." Unexamined truth
would eventually lapse into "dead dogma."l2 Consequently, the social
benefit derived from the discovery of truth, as well as the individual benefit
derived from the rigorous intellectual search, were both dependent on
unfettered freedom of speech and thought.
Mill acknowledged that in the past, freedom of speech was most often
restrained through the force of law." However in more recent times (the
mid-nineteenth century when Mill was writing), speech was more
effectively and pervasively restrained through social intolerance. Indeed,
the most pernicious effect of legal restraint of speech was to "strengthen the
social stigma."14 Mill recognized that private entities, especially through the
use of economic power, could effectively stifle speech. He wrote that "men

Id. at 118.
Id at 102.
Id. at 89.
Id at 88. C.L. Ten understands this to be Mill's most significant argument in favor of freedom of
speech. See C.L. TEN, supranote 2, at 129-30.
6

' MILL, supra note 1, at 87.
't Id. at 90.

" Seeidatill.
12 Id. at 103.
Id. at 98.

"
14

a 10
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might well be imprisoned as excluded from earning their bread.""
However, Mill suggested that social intolerance divorced from economic
sanction or the threat of retaliation was as harmful to freedom of speech and
thought.1 6 Without fear of suffering any material penalty, individuals are
carefully guarded in their speech out of fear of social ostracism." Mill
explained why he saw this fear as a serious problem. Social intolerance of
dissident speech preserves the status quo in matters of opinion. Mill noted
that social intolerance results in "peace in the intellectual world . .. keeping
all things going on therein very much as they do already."" To use a
modern idiom, people go along to get along. This undermines intellectual
and moral courage. "A large portion of the most active and inquiring
intellects" are encouraged to keep their opinions to themselves." This
stifles the mental development of not simply the average citizen but also of
"the most active and inquiring intellects."20 As a result, people are either
likely to set forth arguments that they do not really believe or avoid
addressing controversial issues entirely.2 1 This caused Mill to wonder "Who
can compute what the world loses in the multitude of promising intellects
combined with timid characters, who dare not follow out any bold,
vigorous, independent train of thought, lest it should land them in
something which would admit of being considered irreligious or
immoral?"22 As such, over time, the loss to society is great. But the loss to
the individual is equally great. "No one can be a great thinker who does not
recognise, that as a thinker it is his first duty to follow his intellect to
whatever conclusions it may lead." 23 So from Mill's standpoint, social
intolerance of unconventional speech does significant harm both to
society's interest in exploring and discovering the truth as well as the
individual's interest in developing his or her faculties as an autonomous
thinker.
It is worth pausing to ask exactly what type of social intolerance
troubled Mill so greatly. The threat of social intolerance was a concern that
permeated On Liberty as well as some of Mill's other work.24 However, he

"
16

Id.
Id. at 10(")1.

" Id. at 101.
18 Id
19 Id
20

Id.
Id.
Id at 101-02.
23 Id at 102.
24 See id. at 78-79, 100-01. See also JOHN
SKORUPSKI, MILL, supra note 2, at 366 ("[A] central
object of the Liberty Principle is to protect the individual from enforced conformity to the 'likings and
21
22
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offered few examples of the type of social intolerance that concerned him.
Mill was certainly troubled by religious intolerance which had always been
a problem in England and certainly persisted during the Victorian Age in
which he wrote.25 Mill was by nature an iconoclast and instinctively
rebelled against the dominant culture in which he lived. As such, he could
readily expect a significant degree of social disapproval. Indeed, he invited
it. At the time and to some extent even now, On Liberty was and is a radical
book, and has always provoked counter-argument. Of all of the political and
social causes that Mill promoted, he received the most ridicule and social
26
ostracism for his consistent and heartfelt feminism. But by definition, Mill
was not the type to be chilled or silenced by social intolerance. He was
perhaps the leading public intellectual of his day and relished the challenge.
However, as On Liberty seems to indicate, he feared, perhaps based on
personal experience, that others were not nearly so bold.
Still, one contemporary critique of Mill's social intolerance thesis was
that it was grossly overstated. 27 As Thomas Babbington Macaulay noted in
28
his journal, "[h]e is really crying 'Fire!' in Noah's flood." Mill's radical
and provocative volume On Liberty was published in London in 1859.29 In
the very same year in the very same city, Charles Darwin published The
Origin of Species, a book that was in the Victorian world even more radical
than On Liberty.30 Moreover, eleven years earlier in London, Karl Marx had
published The Communist Manifesto and eight years after the publication of
On Liberty, Marx published Das Kapital.3 Thus it would seem that midnineteenth century London was in fact an extremely intellectually vibrant
place, at least for major thinkers. Mill may have been aware that Darwin
had delayed publication of The Origin of Species out of fear of being
branded an atheist.3 2 Even if the great thinkers were uninhibited, Mill was
justifiably concerned that most people would not possess the moral courage
of a Mill, Darwin, or Marx. Mill later suggested that he was largely
concerned that social intolerance would become significantly more
dislikings' of society.").
2 REEVES, supra note 2, at 294-95.
26
27

Id. at 388-89.
Id. at 296; see SCARRE, supra note 2, at 23 (quoting examples of such critiques).

28 See Peter Nicolson, The Reception and Early Reputation of Mill's Political Thought, in THE

CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO MILL 464, 469 (John Skorupski ed., 1998) (quoting Macaulay). Nicolson
argues that contrary to Mill, his critics significantly underestimated the existing social intolerance in
contemporary England which became clearer as Mill propounded his feminist principles. See id at 46575.
29

30
31
1968)
32

MILL, supra note 1, at ix.
CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (Harvard Univ. Press 1964) (1859).
KARL MARX AND FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (Washington Square Press
(1848); KARL MARX, DAS KAPITAL (Pacific Publishing Studio 2010) (1867).
REEVES, supra note 2 at 295.
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powerful and inhibiting in the future." Whether Mill intended this or not,
Mill's fear of the power of social intolerance resonates in the era of political
correctness.
The values promoted by, and the theoretical foundations of, freedom of
speech have been the topic of intense debate ever since Mill wrote and
before.34 Mill captured several important values promoted by freedom of
speech, most particularly the search for truth and the development of the
intellect. Mill did not develop the theory that speech was essential to
democratic self-government. The absence of this theory is not surprising
given that Mill feared the "tyranny of the majority" and, as such, was quite
skeptical of democracy." There are other defenses of free speech that Mill
did not raise. This article will focus exclusively on the arguments that Mill
did make-the search for truth, and more significantly the development of
the intellect, since Mill seemed to suggest that the latter was most deeply
impacted by social intolerance.
II. THE POLITICAL CORRECTNESS MOVEMENT

The phenomena that so disturbed Mill is a troubling aspect of
contemporary culture. Just as there is almost certainly greater protection
against government prohibition of speech than ever before, there also seems
to be greater social intolerance toward many types of speech than there has
ever been in the past. However, lest we assume that social intolerance of
speech in the United States is a new phenomenon, we should remember that
in the 1840s Alexis de Toqueville, who had a profound influence on Mill,
wrote that "I know of no country in which there is so little independence of
mind and real freedom of discussion as in America."36 While there is much
greater tolerance of speech that would have been subject to social as well as
legal censure in the not too distant past including seditious and sexually
oriented speech, there is far less tolerance of speech that might be deemed
offensive or insensitive with respect to race, gender, sexual orientation, or
speech that might be considered offensive to or by various cultural or social
groups. This sensitivity to speech is commonly characterized as political
correctness and seems to be largely a product of the last two or three

JOHN STUART MILL, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 162-63 (Columbia Univ. Press 1924) (1873).
34 See, e.g., ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 1-36 (2d
ed. 2005); FREDERICK SCHAUER,
FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 3-72 (1982); Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech
Justfications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119 (1989).
31 See REEVES, supra note 2, at 7, 114.
36 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
263 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1994) (1835).
Mill borrowed the phrase "tyranny of the majority" from Tocqueville. Id. at 269.
3
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decades.37 Sometimes, it is manifested in the form of speech codes at
universities or disciplinary policies or decisions in the private employment
or business context. More commonly it is reflected through social stigma or
intolerance. The application of social intolerance to scurrilous epithets and
insults which tend to fall well outside of the pale of socially acceptable
speech is not necessarily disturbing. However, the extension of social
stigma to any discussion of controversial racial or sexual issues, such as the
wisdom of race-based affirmative action, the moral legitimacy of abortion
or same-sex marriage, or whether police officers unfairly target minorities,
does appear to intrude deeply into the traditional and legitimate domain of
free speech. Unfortunately, the latter seems to occur all too often.
There are many explanations for the rise of political correctness. It is a
38
movement that tends to be connected with the political left. It seems to
owe a debt to certain strains of post-modernist thinking which equates the
39
use of language with action and the structure of society. Hence changing
language changes behavior. Another source of political correctness is the
contemporary emphasis on the concept of equality, especially with respect
40
to groups which are viewed as the subjects of past discrimination.
Negative or seemingly negative speech about subordinated or previously
subordinated groups is regarded as a manifestation of discrimination or
domination itself.4 1 Intolerance of certain types of speech may exemplify a

37 The literature on political correctness is enormous. See, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, YOU CAN'T
SAY THAT: THE GROWING THREAT TO CIVIL LIBERTIES FROM ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS 59-61
(2003); NAT HENTOFF, FREE SPEECH FOR ME BUT NOT FOR THEE: HOW THE AMERICAN LEFT AND
RIGHT RELENTLESSLY CENSOR EACH OTHER 55-57 (1992); GREG LUKIANOFF, UNLEARNING LIBERTY:
CAMPUS CENSORSHIP AND THE END OF AMERICAN DEBATE 48 (2014); KIRSTEN POWERS, THE
SILENCING: HOW THE LEFT IS KILLING FREE SPEECH 1-18 (2015); ROGER L. SIMON, I KNOW BEST
119-21 (2016); MICHAEL SMERCONISH, MUZZLED 28 (2006); KIMBERLEY STRASSEL, THE
INTIMIDATION GAME: HOW THE LEFT IS SILENCING FREE SPEECH 363-66 (2016). See generally

Lackland H. Bloom. Jr, Fighting Back: Offensive Speech and Cultural Conflict, 46 SMU L. REV. 145

the
(1992) for extensive citation to the literature as it stood in 1992 during the first wave of furor over
political correctness movement
38 See, e.g., POWERS, supra note 37, at 4; Angelo Codevilla, The Rise of PoliticalCorrectness,XVI
CLAREMONT REV. OF BOOKS, #4 (Fall 2016).
" See Stephen G. Gey, The Case Against Postmodern Censorship Theory, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 193,
198 (1996) (explaining how the postmodem censorship movement is at least partially derived from
social construction theory); Kathleen Sullivan, Free Speech Wars, 48 SMU L. REV. 203, 210 (1995)
(explaining how the proponents of hate speech regulation believe that "[i]f you want to change reality,
you have to change the speech that constructs it").; Jillian Kay Melchior, Censorship Is Free Speech? It
Must be the Class of 1984, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2017, at Al5; see also JUNG MIN CHOI & JOHN W.
MURPHY, THE POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY OF POLITICAL CORRECTNESS (1992) for a vigorous defense of
the movement.
4 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 37; Gey, supra note 39, at 281 (explicating how postmodern
censorship is derived from egalitarian theory); Sullivan supra note 39, at 212-13.
This approach was developed by legal scholars associated with the critical race theory
4"
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new hyper-sensitivity or politeness. Insulting or insensitive speech is seen
as hurtful to feelings or, in the extreme case, as capable of inflicting severe
emotional damage.42 That in itself is considered worth preventing. Along
with the contemporary concern with the value of equality is an emphasis on
dignity and respect as foundational values.43 Speech which undermines
either is considered problematic. Social intolerance of speech may often be
the product of an attempt to exercise power either to suppress opinions or
ideas that are considered misguided, or simply to demonize political or
cultural opponents." Whatever the reasons for the rise of political
correctness or increased social intolerance of speech, once it gains a certain
degree of traction in society, it exerts significant control over the domain of
free speech.45
A. Private Tangible Restraintand Social Censorship
Under the United States Constitution, the First Amendment prohibits
only state action that interferes with freedom of speech. 46 Nongovernmental restraint of freedom of speech is beyond the scope of
constitutional control. Hence, when non-governmental actors interfere with
free speech there may be damage to free speech values but there will be no
First Amendment violation. However, as Mill argued, non-governmental or
movement. A collection of their seminal work is contained in MARI J. MATSUDA, ET. AL., WORDS THAT
WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON LAW, CULTURE, & SOCIETY) (1993) (containing essays by Richard Delgado, Mari J.

Matsuda, Charles Lawrence 111, and Kimberlee Crenshaw).
42 See Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name
Calling, in WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1993).
43 See, e.g, SAMUEL WALKER, HATE SPEECH: THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN
CONTROVERSY 137

(1994).
' Charles Fried, The New FirstAmendment Jurisprudence:A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHi. L. REV.
225, 246 (1992); see also Larry Alexander, BanningHate Speech and the Sticks and Stones Defense, 13

CONST. COMMENT. 71, 98 (1996) ("1 believe that [the hate speech movement] is motivated primarily by
hatred of those with bigoted attitudes and a desire to exercise power over them."); Lawrence Lessig, The
Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 1016 (1995) ("What drives the passion of the
anti-PCs is the idea that what is 'offensive' is being defined or determined by some particular group,
and defined differently from what we happen now to find offensive.").
45 James Gibson, The Political Consequences of Intolerance: Cultural Conformity and
Political

Freedom, 86 AM. POL. SCL REV. 338, 339 (1992)
("Thus I hypothesize that people learn from the political culture that intolerance is widespread, that it is
acceptable, and that there are tangible risks to asserting views that the intolerant culture finds
objectionable.").
'

See generally, Julian N. Eule & Jonathon D. Varat, TransportingFirstAmendment Norms to the

Private Sector: With Every Wish There Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1537 (1998) (explaining the
limits of free speech rights against state action, how those limits might expand into the private sector,
and the serious constitutional pitfalls of expanding free speech rights to private parties).

PoliticalCorrectness

2017]1

9

private restraint of speech may be as, if not more, threatening to freedom of
47
speech than legal restriction. Arguably, non-governmental interference
with free speech may be divided into two interrelated categories-1) the
imposition of tangible harm to the individual as a result of his or her speech,
such as loss of a job, a poor grade in a class, or suspension from school, or
2) pure social intolerance or stigmatization with no infliction of tangible
harm. Either may have a debilitating impact on freedom of speech and its
values. Mill was clearly concerned with the impact of both. He declared that
"men might as well be imprisoned as excluded from the means of earning
their bread."4 8 Economic retaliation by employers or others would quite
obviously have a severe chilling effect on free speech. Persons or groups in
positions of authority or control, whether governmental or private, are
obviously in a position to chill or silence the speech of dependents or
subordinates. Experience teaches that such authority is frequently employed
in a biased, discriminatory, or self-serving manner. Consequently, private
power often poses a serious threat to free speech values.
A society that respects freedom of speech should discourage private
censorship at least in many instances. In settings such as the university, free
speech and inquiry should be protected as essential to the very mission of
the institution. As former President of Yale University Benno Schmidt
declared, "a university is a place where people have to have the right to
speak the unspeakable and think the unthinkable and challenge the
unchallengeable." 49 Although governmental protection of free speech in the
private university is a possibility,"o private internal protection would be
preferable given that it is always dangerous for the government to become
involved in the regulation of speech even to protect it.
In other areas of private enterprise and organization however, there are
often valid reasons for restricting speech of employees or association
members. A private entity should have the right to restrict the speech of its

4

See MILL, supranote 1, at 101.

* Id. at 100.
* See HENTOFF, supranote 37, at 152 (quoting Benno Schmidt's interview with Fred Friendly).
* California, Maine, and Massachusetts have passed legislation extending legal protection to
speech at private universities. See Cal. Educ. Code § 48950 (West 2010) (the California Act is known as
the Leonard Law); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4681-82 (West 2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
12, §§ l H-111 (West 2014). In the past year, several state legislatures have passed similar legislation:
Colorado SB 17-062; Kentucky SB 117; North Carolina HB 527; Tennessee SB 723; Utah HB 54 and
Virginia HIB 1401. See S.B. 17-062, 71st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2017) (enacted); S.B. 117,
2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2017) (enacted); H.B. 527, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2017)
(enacted); S.B. 723, 110th Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2017) (enacted); H.B. 54, 62d Leg.,
Gen. Sess. (Utah 2017) (enacted); H.B. 1401, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2017) (enacted). This
type of legislation is pending in other states as well. See, e.g., H.B. 363, 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Ohio 2017).

10
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members which undermines its enterprise or mission. A business ought to
be able to prohibit speech by its employees that denigrates the products or
goodwill of the business. Likewise, it should be able to restrict the speech
of employees such as sexually harassing speech that makes it more difficult
to achieve its legitimate ends. Some of this restriction will be legally
imposed and some will be the result of contract. As Mill observed,
restraints which exclude a person from "earning their bread" may have a
significant impact on free speech, however in a free enterprise economy,
such restraints are both inevitable and valuable." At least to some extent,
the individual whose speech is restrained has chosen to work for or
associate with the entity imposing the restrictions. As a practical matter
such choices may not be entirely voluntary in the broadest sense of the
word, however there is usually still an element of choice involved. The
primary focus of this article, however, will be censorship through social
intolerance as opposed to censorship through the restriction of private
tangible benefits.
B. SocialIntolerance andFreedom ofSpeech
1. The Costs of Social Intolerance of Speech
It is certainly difficult to disentangle pure social censorship from the
threat of, or at least the fear of, future economic reprisal. A primary reason
why social censorship is so effective is because the individual whose speech
may be chilled or silenced may fear that unpopular speech today may lead
to tangible or economic harm in the future even if no present threat has been
made. It is better to be safe than sorry. Even so, when there is no present
threat of tangible harm, it is best considered as a case of social censorship.
The question then arises whether Mill's concern about the impact of social
censorship on freedom of speech was warranted. What is so terrible about
social intolerance of offensive, insensitive, or otherwise disagreeable
speech?
As Mill so clearly recognized, social ostracism is powerful.5 2 People are
social animals. Few people are comfortable in the role of iconoclast or
social outcast. In contemporary society, few would care to risk
characterization as racists, sexists, or homophobes, however unfairly.
Moreover, most people are not the "inquiring intellects" and "fearless
characters" that Mill so admired but rather, as Mill well understood, simply

5
52

MLL, supra note 1, at 100.
MILL, supra note 1, at 156
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individuals who hope to live their lives in peace with as little controversy as
possible. For most, conformity is a small price to pay for social peace.
Mill spoke to the harms inflicted by social intolerance." A speaker who
fears or is sensitive to social censure will often feel as though he or she is
walking on eggshells, or, as Mill put it, whose "reason [is] cowed, by the
fear of heresy." 54 In any situation where such censure may arise, the
potential speaker will feel the weight of inhibition. Navigating a
conversation can become an unpleasant experience in which the speaker is
constantly attempting to avoid saying the wrong thing. This is scarcely the
frame of mind that a free speech culture should encourage. As one
commentator noted, "[p]olitical courage should not be needed to live a

life.",
Apart from the feeling of inhibition, the speaker will be inhibited in
fact. The speaker will not say what is truly on his or her mind. As Mill
noted, social censorship creates "[a] state of things in which [many] find it
advisable to keep the general principles and grounds of their convictions
6
within their own breasts."5 This would seem to be the very opposite of the
condition that a healthy free speech culture would hope to create. To return
again to Mill: "where there is a tacit convention that principles are not to be
disputed; where the discussion of the greatest questions which can occupy
humanity is considered to be closed, we cannot hope to find that generally
high scale of mental activity which has made some periods of history so
remarkable." 5 7
This is perhaps Mill's most important insight and concern. Mill clearly
believed that freedom of speech was essential to freedom of thought and to
the continual and progressive development of the intellect.s A person who
is afraid to speak will inevitably be afraid to think. As comedian Chris Rock
recently observed in explaining why he no longer performs on college

53

Id.

Id at 101.
" George Kateb, Freedom of Worthless and Harmful Speech, in LIBERALISM WITHOUT ILLUSIONS:
ESSAYS ON LIBERAL THEORY AND THE POLITICAL VISION OF JUDITH N. SHKLAR 220, 237 (1996)
5'

("Expressing and receiving expression by permission becomes the norm.").
"

MILL, supra note 1, at 101.

* Id. at 102. Jeremy Waldron points out that the same inhibition and consequent stagnation of
thought can readily occur within cultural minority communities as well. Jeremy Waldron, Mill and
Multiculturalism,in ON LIBERTY A CRITICAL GUIDE 165, 174 (C.L. Ten ed., 2008). He argues that Mill

would presumably be comfortable with multiculturalism in that he valued social diversity, however he
would be troubled by social conformity within cultural minority groups given that this would also
suppress individuality. Id. at 165-66, 183-84.
" See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 283 (2011) (presenting a contemporary exposition of the relationship between freedom of
speech and freedom of thought).
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campuses, "You can't think the thoughts you want to think if you think you
are being watched."59 The self-censored speaker will never achieve his or
her true intellectual potential. This results in a loss of intellectual autonomy
as well as the capacity for moral growth. The mind is constrained from
becoming everything that it could be. Arguably this stifling of intellectual
imagination and creativity is the most extreme cost of social intolerance or
political correctness.
The loss from social censorship is not limited to the individual but
affects society as well. When an individual engages in self-censorship out
of fear of social intolerance, the public is deprived of whatever truths or
contributions may have been revealed through less inhibited speech. The
search for truth is restricted. Moreover, the overall intellectual atmosphere
of society is inhibited by the self-censorship of its members. Mill clearly
recognized each of these dangers. They remain serious costs of social
censorship in our day as well.
Social intolerance strikes at the very heart of freedom of speech. Social
stigmatization of particular opinions or subjects is intended to cleanse the
public arena of unpleasantness and offensiveness; to effectively disapprove
of certain points of view. If so, it is censorship pure and simple. The
exclusion of particular opinions or viewpoints from the marketplace of
ideas is certainly inconsistent with Mill's powerful argument that it is only
through consideration of all perspectives that either the individual or society
can achieve at least some intellectual progress.' And although social
disapproval will not entirely stifle the promulgation of dissenting views,
they may be excluded from specific communities such as college campuses.
If social intolerance becomes sufficiently widespread, it exercises a
profound impact on the nature of speech. Still, in a diverse and
heterogeneous society, it is likely that there will be a supply of iconoclasts
who are willing to challenge social mores and engage in socially
disapproved expression. Consequently, the chilling effect will hardly be
complete. Indeed, if sufficient resentment of social intolerance or political
correctness develops, a certain amount of speech challenging accepted
social boundaries is likely to occur. Still, the impact of social intolerance on
free speech will be significant. And perhaps the most serious harm will be
that which most concerned Mill-the stifling of autonomous thought
through the creation of a pall of orthodoxy.

s9 POWERS, supra note 37, at 77.
6 MILL, supra note 1, at 86-87.
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The chilling effect on speech is notoriously difficult to prove
empirically."i Consequently, the chilling effect thesis is largely based on
anecdote and intuition. Mill assumed that if speech is penalized legally,
economically, or socially, there will be less of it, especially with respect to
matters of controversy.62 There is a wealth of contemporary evidence to
confirm that conclusion. The late Nat Hentoff, perhaps the most vigorous
defender of freedom of speech in the nation over the past several decades,
provides several explicit examples of the chilling effect in action in the
chapter of his book Free Speech for Me, But Not For Thee entitled "The
Pall of Orthodoxy on the Nation's Campuses."' In particular, Hentoff
quotes one student as noting, "A lot of times I don't want to speak up in
class. Otherwise I'd have 40 percent of the class on me saying I'm a
counterrevolutionary racist fascist. I'm normal. I don't want everyone to
hate me for my view.""
Greg Lukianoff, the president of the Foundation for Individual Rights
in Education (FIRE), details example after example of the chilling effect in
6
action throughout his book Unlearning Liberty. ' He concludes that "[i]f
people believe there is any risk of punishment for stating an opinion, most
will not bother opening their mouths; and in time, the rules that create this
silence become molded into the culture.'" In support of this conclusion, he
cites an American Association of Colleges and Universities 2010 survey of
24,000 students that revealed only 30 percent of students strongly agreed
with the statement: "it [is] safe to have unpopular views on campus.'
68
Moreover, only 16.7 percent of faculty strongly agreed with the statement.
Likewise, a 1987 survey found "only 6% of the American people would

61 See Brandice Canes-Wrone & Michael Dorf, Measuringthe Chilling Effect, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV.

1095 (2015) for an attempt.
62 MILL, supra note 1, at 87-88.
63 HENTOFF, supra note 37, at 146-92.
'

Id. at 154; see Dennis Chong, Free Speech and MulticulturalismIn and Out of the Academy, 27

POL. PSYCHOL. 29, 34 (2006) ("College students are making the transition from their teen years to
adulthood and are highly susceptible to normative pressures because they have weak attitudes on many
issues and desire social acceptance."); see also Robert D. Cooter, Three Effects ofSocial Norms on Law:
Expression, Deterrence, and Internalization, 79 OR. L. REv. 1, 8 (2000) ("People are notoriously

susceptible to group pressures . . . ."); Cass Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L.
REv. 2021, 2034 (1996) ("We might take the term 'political correctness' to connote a willingness to say
or do something not because of its intrinsic value but because of reputational effects.").
6s

LUKIANOFF, supra note 37.

66 Id. at 9.
67 Id.

' Id; see also Suzanne Feigelson, The Silent Classroom, AMHERST MAG., Fall 2001; Mitchiko
Kakutani, Critic'sNotebook: Debate? Dissent? Discussion?Oh, Don't Go There, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23,
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allow the group they most dislike to enjoy the same political rights and
opportunities that the rest of the polity enjoy." 69
2. The Value of Social Censorship
Self-censorship induced by social intolerance can clearly undermine the
values that freedom of speech is intended to serve. However, social
intolerance is also an aspect of free speech, and is not without some value
as well. In any culture or community, free speech has limits. For instance,
the First Amendment, by its terms, seems to provide absolute protection to
speech; but that has never been the case. For example, speech that threatens
immediate physical danger to the individual or to the nation is and always
has been prohibited.70 Likewise, libelous speech published with knowledge
of its falsity is unprotected." Also, false or misleading commercial speech
is unprotected.72 The context matters as well. Speech that would be
permissible at a sporting event might be prohibited in a classroom or
courtroom.73 Free speech inevitably has boundaries. With respect to legal
regulation, the law itself sets the boundaries.
Boundaries exist in the social context as well. They are set by social
convention and enforced by social intolerance. As developed above, speech
has value in any community. But it is not entirely positive. Speech can also
cause harm. Speech can insult and wound. Speech can render
communication and social interaction difficult if not impossible. Speech can
lead to fear, distrust, and isolation. If valuable communication is to flourish,
not everything that can be said should be said. Much speech should be selfcensored. Thus social intolerance provides a crucial means of enforcing the
legitimate boundaries of a free speech community. As such, social
intolerance is essential to the continuance of freedom of speech. Indeed,
social intolerance is an aspect of free speech; it is a part, indeed an
important part, of the marketplace of ideas. Social intolerance can serve
several valuable functions. It can attempt to preserve some minimal level of

Gibson, supra note 45, at 340.
Initially, the government could prohibit speech that had a tendency to cause violence or
insurrection. In the Supreme Court's first significant First Amendment opinion, Schenk v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1917), Justice Holmes declared that speech must pose a "clear and present danger" before
it can be prohibited. After one half century of legal dispute, the Court finally concluded that seditious or
violence-inducing speech could be prohibited only if it incited immediate illegal action. Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 394 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
71 See, e.g., Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S.
323 (1974).
72 See, e.g, Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.
v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980).
7 See, e.g, Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452
U.S. 640, 647 (1981)
(explicating the time, place, and manner doctrine).
69
70
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civility in discourse, which in itself is essential to the continued flow of
ideas. If a person is subject to personal vilification when venturing to offer
an opinion, it is likely that most people, to avoid suffering such offense,
will steer clear of the "marketplace." Just as social intolerance can readily
inhibit speech as Mill recognized, a complete absence of social intolerance
can have the same effect.
Social intolerance can also be employed as a means of attempting to
reject bad ideas, especially ideas or opinions that are demonstrably false.
For instance, if a person denies the existence of the holocaust, one method
of response is counter argument through voluminous factual recitation.
Another response is social ostracization; that is, conveying the message
socially that this opinion has been entirely debunked and has no place in
civilized discourse. This is arguably a completely legitimate means of
responding to a false and hurtful argument. Of course, Mill would disagree.
He argued that as long as one person holds an opinion, however false, it
must be met with counter-argument, not suppression even through social
intolerance.74 Mill argued that even false ideas help us better to appreciate
the truth." Does holocaust denial help us to better appreciate the horror of
the event? Probably not. But Mill's response was that the exclusion of any
argument, however false or harmful, from the marketplace must proceed
from an unwarranted assumption of infallibility." Once we allow ourselves
to assume that we are infallible enough to conclude that the holocaust did
happen, and therefore holocaust deniers and their speech should be
shunned, have we also concluded that we are infallible enough to exclude
other speech as well, such as the denial of man-made global warming? For
Mill, it was all or nothing. He explicitly rejected the argument that freedom
of discussion should not be "pushed to an extreme."" Rather, pushing
speech to the extreme was the ultimate validation of the free speech
principle.
However, as Mill well understood, there are boundaries in the real
social world of freedom of speech. One legitimate function of social
intolerance is to establish boundaries for free speech which discourage
personal vilification and insult not simply to avoid offense but to promote
the market by avoiding the silencing of the victims of such attacks. At least
some of the campaign to penalize hate speech has proceeded on that theory.
For the marketplace of ideas to function as it proponents assume,

74 See MILL, supra note 1, at 87.

7 Id.

Id. at 88.
n Id at 91.
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disagreements should be settled by civil discussion rather than name calling
and demonization. Indeed, near the conclusion of Chapter Two, Mill
maintained that freedom of speech assumes "temperate" debate that does
not exceed "the bounds of fair discussion."" However, he quickly
recognized that temperance is very much in the eye of the beholder. A
vigorously pressed argument is often characterized as intemperate." He
declared that the charge of intemperance was most often leveled against
those who challenged the status quo.so Mill condemned those who
"stigmatize those who hold the contrary opinion as bad and immoral
men."8 ' Thus Mill clearly favored rational, moderate, and polite argument
on the merits but understood that in the real marketplace of ideas, that was
often not the case. And in any event "law and authority have no business
restraining" the "employment of vituperative language" or "offensive
attacks." 82 Giving a fair and respectful hearing to all sides "is the real
morality of public discussion."8 3 This was Mill's conception of the way it
should be with recognition that it is "often violated" sometimes by Mill
himself who was inclined to employ "all the polemical tools at his disposal"
to win a political argument."
Ideally, the boundaries of legitimate speech ought to be set by rational
discussion of that very question. In reality, they are set to some extent by
such debate but perhaps even more so by social intolerance of speech that
exceeds conventional boundaries without fair discussion of whether that is
appropriate. From this perspective, social intolerance is simply one
powerful way in which the market operates-not ideal but preferable to
authoritarian regulation.
Another function of social intolerance is indeed to rule certain ideas and
opinions out of bounds. But assuming that it is appropriate to employ social
intolerance to exclude the incontestable from the marketplace of ideas, there
will be serious debate over how we determine that any idea is indeed
incontestable. And all of human history, especially our era of political
correctness, teaches that the highly contestable will also be banned as well.
Indeed, one of Mill's primary arguments for freedom of speech proceeded
from the recognition that so many beliefs now accepted as true had once

Id. at 118.
Id
8 Id at 119.
81 Id.
82 id.
78

7

8' Id at 120.
8
REEVES, supra note 2, at 4.
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"been deemed not only false but absurd."" Social intolerance has at least
some positive value in setting the outer boundaries of acceptable speech.
But at the same time it poses extreme hazards to the values of free speech as
well.
3. Social Intolerance and the Boundaries of Free Speech
Mill valued freedom of speech because it would permit the gradual and
progressive discovery of truth both by individual and by society. Perhaps,
even more importantly he believed that unrestrained speech would
encourage critical thinking and intellectual development. If free speech
must continually reject bad ideas and advance through consistent
reevaluation of accepted truth, critical counter-speech will play a significant
role. Currently entrenched ideas will constantly be subject to challenge.
Sometimes the challenge will be polite. Sometimes it will be caustic. For
Mill, the debate was never over. It is a continuing process. Obviously,
social intolerance leading to self-censorship presents a threat to this
conception of free inquiry. On the other hand, completely unrestrained
speech can undermine the conditions necessary to the realization of these
goals by rendering the marketplace of ideas a war zone to be avoided by all
but the most insensitive. Thus even under Mill's conception of a fully
liberated marketplace of ideas, some boundaries are needed if only to render
free speech a desirable enterprise. One of the roles of social intolerance is to
set and enforce the legitimate boundaries of freedom of speech. The
response of free speech is to continually challenge the boundaries. Political
correctness as we understand it is an attempt to adjust the boundaries
moving them inward. The anti-political correctness movement is an attempt
preserve the boundaries where they were or perhaps to even push them
outward. As such, social intolerance or political correctness is freedom of
speech in action, as is the counter movement. Determining the appropriate
boundaries of the marketplace of ideas, at least in the private domain, is a
debate over a significant political issue-what should be the limits of
freedom of speech? Ideally, it is best resolved through the marketplace of
ideas itself. However, there are complications.
Assuming that social intolerance does have a chilling effect on
otherwise acceptable speech, is the self-censorship the result of actual social
intolerance or at least to some extent is it the product of a perception of
social intolerance, a perception that may in fact be exaggerated or perhaps
have little basis at all? Perhaps one of the most devious aspects of social

8s

MILL, supra note 1, at 88-89.
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intolerance of speech is that once it becomes entrenched, it may create an
atmosphere in which the fear of intolerance outstrips its very existence. In a
sense, this is the chilling effect on steroids. The timid fear social
consequences where perhaps none exist. As Mill recognized, speech is
fragile and is easily chilled.86 It is responsive to the social or cultural
climate. From the standpoint of the search for truth or intellectual
development, it shouldn't matter whether self-censorship is the result of
displayed or merely perceived social intolerance-the harm to free speech
values is the same. But this raises an important point.
The realization of freedom of speech is dependent on a culture that
values it. The point, indeed the intent, of social intolerance of speech or
political correctness, is to convey the message that no such culture exists;
rather, that free speech is risky and may lead to trouble. It is best not to
press it. Although social pressure has a legitimate role to play in defining
the boundaries of speech and as a means of implicit counter-argument, like
dynamite it must be handled with care. If social intolerance of speech
becomes pervasive, it can be toxic. Mill was arguing for a spirit of free and
unconstrained inquiry. That requires certain social or cultural
understandings. These understandings are always contestable. Like the
legitimate boundaries of speech, whether there is or should be an
entrenched or privileged free speech culture is a matter on which
individuals can and will differ. The value and limits of free speech are quite
properly matters open for debate in the marketplace of ideas. As a society,
we may have largely rejected legal restraint on speech, but as Mill
recognized in 1859, and as is still the case today, the validity of social
restraint remains and will continue to remain a contested issue.
Self-censorship, the so-called chilling effect, is distinguishable from
legal censorship or censorship by private authority (i.e. employers, schools,
or associations) in that the potential speaker is generally exercising greater
autonomy. This would be the case whether the self-censorship is
attributable to fear of legal or economic sanctions, or simply social
ostracism. Arguably, the speaker exercises greater autonomy when faced
with social intolerance than with legal or economic sanction, though Mill
might disagree.
Often when faced with the prospect of adverse social reaction, the
speaker has made a rational calculation that it would be preferable to keep
quiet. Is that problematic? Mill was something of a libertarian privileging
individual liberty and autonomy above nearly all else. From the perspective

8

Id. at 77-78.
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of intellectual autonomy, shouldn't the individual's decision to self-censor
in the face of social intolerance be entitled to respect? Would it not be
unduly paternalistic to conclude otherwise? Mill seems to respond that such
self-censorship in the face of social intolerance is inauthentic; that is "to fit
as much as they can of their own conclusions to premises which they have
internally rejected."" In other words, to dissemble. As Mill argued, from
the perspective of intellectual growth, that can't be good.
Virtually all speech, perhaps with the exception of that of lunatics or
89
edgy comedians, is self-censored or self-edited. Even when speaking, an
individual generally hopes to appear articulate and thoughtful and
consequently almost automatically edits his or her own speech accordingly.
Not only is some degree of self-censorship good, it is inevitable. The line
between ordinary self-editing and socially induced self-censorship can be
indistinct at times and may often be invisible to the speaker. Speech takes
place within a culture and the understood norms of the culture necessarily
affect what is said and not said. Sometimes those norms as expressed
through social intolerance are clear and explicit. Perhaps more often they
are implicit and internalized. Yet even the boldest and most provocative
Millian intellectual almost certainly engages in some self-censorship while
speaking. Separating that self-censorship attributable to social coercion
from that attributable to autonomous good judgement is no easy task.
If the only loss through social intolerance of speech was to
individualistic values of the autonomous thinker, then respecting the
individual's decision to self-censor in response to social intolerance might
be acceptable at least from a libertarian perspective. Acceding to social
intolerance might certainly undermine the individual's intellectual
development so prized by Mill, but that should probably be left to the
particular individual. But there is a significant social loss as well. There is
the potential loss of the progression towards truth in the marketplace of
ideas recognized by Mill. That is a given. But beyond that, as Mill seemed
to recognize, there is a loss as well to society as one less critical thinker
emerges and engages. Mill hoped for a society in which at least the best and
the brightest enter the intellectual arena and participate. That's how
intellectual progress occurs. It is simply a less vibrant society when many
are content to remain on the sidelines out of fear of social disapproval. The

88 Id. at 10 1.

" Lenny Bruce was one of the least self-censored individuals in recent memory, and he suffered
significant persecution as a result. See LENNY BRUCE, How TO TALK DIRTY AND INFLUENCE PEOPLE

(1964). The theme of Larry David's show Curb Your Enthusiasm is the travails of a person who is likely
to say whatever pops into his head.
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loss may not be concrete, but for Mill it was real and serious. And it is
indeed a value threatened by contemporary notions of political correctness.
C Social Norms andthe Boundaries ofFree Speech
To a significant extent Mill was correct. Social intolerance does
undermine the values of free speech and free thought. It keeps important
ideas from entering the marketplace of ideas, depriving both the individual
and society of the opportunity to consider them for what they may be worth.
It inhibits the ability of the individual and society to persistently evaluate
premises and beliefs, that is, to engage in critical thinking. It reinforces the
status quo, whatever it may be at a given time, by rendering it more socially
costly to challenge accepted opinion. This in turn inhibits the individual
from both speaking and then thinking. It makes speaking hazardous and
often unpleasantly risky. It deprives society of the benefit of at least some
significant thinkers. So Mill argued and so experience, especially
contemporary experience, confirms. Those who have studied the impact of
political correctness, especially, though hardly exclusively, on college
campuses, recognize the existence of the very harms that so troubled Mill.
But there is another side to it. Though Mill might disagree, unrestrained
speech is not necessarily an unmitigated good.90 Not all speech contributes
to the individual or societal well-being. Some speech is primarily harmful.
Some speech undermines the search for truth as well as individual
intellectual development. To some extent social intolerance of speech is
itself a form of counter-speech entitled to claim protection. To some extent,
social intolerance is a legitimate attempt to define the boundaries of the
acceptable. But not always. Frequently, it is an attempt to silence dissent
and counter-argument and to exclude disapproved ideas from the realm of
debate. That is, sometimes it is exactly what Mill believed it to be.
What if anything can or should be done about social intolerance of
speech? Any prospect of government response or regulation should be
rejected definitively. History and experience have shown that government is
incapable of regulating freedom of speech in a fair and unbiased manner.
Moreover, there is little if anything that the government could do to
constrain social intolerance outside of a pervasive and intrusive police state,
and even that might be ineffective.
Rather, the only hope of keeping social intolerance of speech within
acceptable bounds is through continual maintenance of a vibrant free speech
culture. To a significant extent freedom of speech, even against government

'

See MILL, supra note 1, at 83.
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regulation, is protected less by the First Amendment than by cultural belief.
The law and the culture are to be sure inextricably intertwined. Legal
protection nourishes cultural belief and vice versa. Despite the emergence
of political correctness, the culture of contemporary America is probably as,
if not more, speech protective than any that has ever existed. So in
maintaining a culture in which free speech is highly valued, the United
States has a solid foundation on which to build. There is certainly a vibrant
individualistic streak in American society that rebels against the restriction
of speech whether by public or private authority. Moreover, there is at least
some appreciation of why speech is especially valuable to both the
individual and society. The very fact that instances of social intolerance of
speech in the United States tend to attract public attention speaks to the
vitality of freedom of speech.
At the very heart of the battle between freedom of speech and social
intolerance is a struggle over the development and implementation of social
norms. Cass Sunstein has quite correctly noted that "'Political Correctness'
is no isolated phenomenon. It is ubiquitous. It occurs whenever reputational
91
incentives impose high costs on deviant behavior." Virtually all social
conduct is influenced if not governed by the existence of social norms (as
opposed to laws or privately enforced rules). As Robert Ellickson has
explained "[m]uch of the glue of a society comes not from law enforcement
. . . but rather from the informal enforcement of social mores by
92
acquaintances, bystanders, trading partners, and others." Despite extensive
research, social scientists are in great disagreement as to how to define
norms, where they come from, why they are honored, and why they
sometimes disappear.93 A serviceable working definition is "a social norm

Cass Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 915 (1996).
92

Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discover Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537, 540

(1998).
93 See, e.g., Elizabeth Anderson, Beyond Homo Economicus: New Developments in Theories of

Social Norms, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 170, 170 (2000) ("These questions lead to one of the central
puzzles of social theory: that of explaining why people comply with social norms."); Ernest Fehr & Urs
Fischbacher, Social Norms and Human Cooperation, 8 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCi., Apr. 2004, at 185

("The existence of social norms is one of the great unsolved problems in social cognitive science ... we
still know little about how social norms are formed."); Jack Gibbs, Norms: The Problem of Definition
and Classification,70 AM. J. Soc. 586, 586 (1965) (arguing there is no accepted definition of norms);
Eric Posner, Law, Economics and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1697, 1699 (1996) ("The
concept of a 'norm' is slippery, and scholars use it in different ways."); Robert E. Scott, The Limits of
Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 U. VA. L. REv. 1603, 1607 (2000) ("[W]e lack even a
basic consensus on the proper definition of a social norm."); id. at 1647 ("We currently lack a persuasive
explanation of the mechanics by which norms evolve and are modified by law, or of the process by
which values are internalized.").
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is an obligation backed by a social sanction."94 There is also disagreement
over how social norms operate. One theory is that social norms are
internalized by the individual resulting in feelings of guilt when the norms
are violated." Another theory emphasizes the external pressures to conform
generated by the quest for the esteem of one's peers.96 Nevertheless, the
social intolerance to which Mill objected and the political correctness at the
center of contemporary debate are a struggle over the social norms which
establish the appropriate boundaries of acceptable speech.
The struggle to establish the appropriate boundaries of socially
acceptable speech has always existed and almost certainly always will.
There seem to have been times in human history when speech has seemed
more dangerous and threatening than at other times. Professor Blasi has
characterized such times as "pathological periods." 97 During such periods,
there has traditionally been greater regulation of speech and certainly more
social intolerance of disfavored speech. The era of political correctness may
qualify as such a period even though solid judicial protection against
content discrimination has stifled attempts to legally curb speech. Arguably,
this has channeled efforts to discourage politically incorrect speech into the
social context with greater vigor. What plays out then is a cultural struggle
(often characterized as a "culture war") over the limits of acceptable speech
between those who would limit and those who would defend freedom of
speech. Mill vigorously cast his lot with the latter.
Although there is no consensus as to why social norms develop or
change, there certainly are factors that seem to exert significant influence.
To some extent, social norms are heavily influenced by the speech and

9 Cooter, supra note 64, at 5; see also Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development and
Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REv. 338, 340 (1997) ("Roughly speaking, by norms this literature
refers to informal social regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow because of an internalized
sense of duty, because of a fear of external sanctions, or both.").
"

See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to

Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643 (1996); see also Anderson, supra note
93, at 172 ("1 shall argue that the normativity of norms plays an indispensable role in accounting for the
motive to comply with them.")
' McAdams, supra note 94, at 342, 355 ("My thesis is that norms arise because people seek the
esteem of others."). McAdams argues that a norm is created when: 1) there is a consensus with respect
to the esteem worthiness of the conduct; 2) there is a risk of detection of engaging in the conduct; and 3)
the consensus and risk of detection is well known. Id. at 358. McAdams attempts to fuse internalization
and externalization theories of norms by arguing that norms initially sanctioned externally by shame
may later be internally sanctioned by guilt in addition. Id. at 381. See Scott, supra note 93, at 1637-38,
for a description of different norm theorists and their approaches.
"

Vincent Blasi, The PathologicalPerspective and the FirstAmendment, 85 COLUM. L. REv.
449,

450 (1985).

PoliticalCorrectness

2017]

23

98
actions of elite opinion makers. Whether society adopts a speech tolerant
or speech restrictive norm depends to some extent on whether political,
business, and educational leaders tend to publically favor one approach or
the other. 99 At universities and colleges where the struggle over speech
norms has been most engaged, the opinions of faculty and administrators
00
will tend to make a difference.
Social norms are also developed through education both formal and
informal. As Mill well understood, speech is an essential human activity.
To a large, though not exclusive, extent, education, including with respect
to social norms, is conveyed and discussed through speech. The attitudes
expressed toward the limitations of free speech in homes, schools, churches,
jobs, and other associations consciously and subconsciously influence
1
attitudes with respect to the legitimate boundaries of speech.' When as
today, the limits of free speech become issues of public controversy,
educators can play a role in the development of norms. Unfortunately, from
a free speech perspective, the political correctness movement and its
negative impact on free speech has been most aggressive and successful on
college campuses. If in fact education plays a significant role in developing
social norms, then speech protective norms may be at risk.
Another factor in the development of social norms is the existence of
organized groups affirmatively supporting the development of, or change

"

Daron Acemoglu & Matthew 0. Jackson, History, Expectations, and Leadership in the Evolution

of Social Norms, 82 REV. ECON. STUD. 423, 423-35 (2015) (citing examples of Nelson Mandela,
George Washington, and Mahatma Gandhi, the authors "show that prominent agents can counter the
power of history by exploiting their visibility to change the prevailing social norm from Low to High").
" Chong, supra note 64, at 30-31 ("The best of the cross-sectional studies has shown that, across
civil liberties issues, the degree of elite consensus about the applicable democratic value on a particular
issue affects the clarity of the norm in the eyes of the public and therefore the likelihood that the norm
will shape public opinion.").
"`

See TIMOTHY C. SWELL, CAMPUS HATE SPEECH ON TRIAL 53 (1998) (discussing how the

intervention of Nat Hentoff, Professor C. Van Woodward, Law School Dean Guido Calabresi, and
University President Benno Schmidt made a significant difference in protecting free speech at Yale
University when it was under assault). However, the university elites can sway the norm in either
direction. See Chong, supra note 64, at 33 ("When respected legal scholars, academics, and other
political elites argue that hate speech is not protected by the First Amendment, they weaken the elite
consensus around the democratic value and potentially affect how people comprehend and apply the
norm of free speech.").
1o'

See Allison Harell, Political Tolerance, Racist Speech, and the Influence ofSocial Networks, 91

Soc. Sci. Q. 724, 724 (2010) ("The analysis suggests that exposure to racial and ethnic diversity in one's
social networks decreases political tolerance of racist speech while simultaneously having a positive
effect on political tolerance of other types of objectionable speech."); Diana C. Mutz, Cross-Cutting
Social Networks: Testing Democratic Theory in Practice, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. Il , 123 (2002)

(suggesting that exposure in social networks to persons with differing political views has a modest
impact on the increase in political tolerance).
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to, a social norm.102 Norms do not necessarily develop in a random or
haphazard manner. Sometimes, a group with the purpose of changing social
attitudes or behavior can be quite successful both with respect to legal rules
and social norms. Obvious examples would be the labor, civil rights,
environmental, feminist, and gay rights movements. In each case, these
movements changed legal and social norms, often radically, but usually
through deliberate and co-ordinated action. Apart from organized groups,
aggressive individuals, "heroes," to use Richard McAdams terminology, or
"norm entrepreneurs," to use Cass Sunstein's phrase, can also play a
significant role in the creation or destruction of social norms.103
Since our free speech tradition has to a large extent developed through
judicial interpretation of the First Amendment, it is likely that social norms
will be heavily influenced by legal norms even though the latter do not
control the former.' To a large but ultimately unknowable extent, our
vigorous free speech culture is attributable to judicial protection of freedom
of speech during the Twentieth Century. The average citizen is unaware of
the state action doctrine and often assumes incorrectly that the First
Amendment protects free speech against private as well as public
restraint."o' And even if people recognize that the First Amendment does
not curb private restriction, and certainly not social intolerance, of speech,
nevertheless the free speech values and principles articulated by the courts
to some extent permeate the culture and are internalized by citizens. If, as
seems to be the case, elite opinion influences social norms, it is likely that
the elite opinion that has been most influential with respect to speech norms
is that of the judges. If the courts have created a legal culture that favors
unrestrained free speech, the social culture has been influenced as well.
History and tradition also influence the development of social normS. 10 6
To an extent, people continue to do what they have always done absent a
reason to change. The United States has not always maintained a tradition
of relatively unrestrained speech, but there has been such a tradition over

102 See WALKER, supra note 43, at 15 ("The principle of free speech has triumphed in large part
because it has had a vigorous and effective advocate.").
103 McAdams, supra note 94, at 366-70; Sunstein, supra note
91, at 909. Sunstein cites Martin
Luther King, William Bennett, Louis Farrakhan, Catherine MacKinnon, Ronald Reagan, and Jerry
Falwell as examples of norm entrepreneurs. Id. at 929.
'" See McAdams, supra note 94, at 349 (citing anti-dueling laws as an example of how "the law can
influence the norm"). See ROBERT L. TSAL, ELOQUENCE AND REASON (Yale Univ. Press 2008), for
examples of the impact of law in the free speech culture.
10s See Eule & Varat, supra note 46, at 1540.
'" Acemoglu & Jackson, supra note 98, at 448 ("[Blehaviour today can be uniquely determined by
distant history that is irrelevant to current payoffs. This is because past events provide information about
how other agents will interpret their information.").
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the past fifty years and that is the period with which most people alive
today would identify. As such, a social norm of relatively unrestrained free
speech represents the status quo.
Art and literature have always had an impact on social norms. Indeed,
one of the points of art and literature is to challenge existing social norms.
If art and literature are broadly defined to include mass entertainment
through movies, television, music, and social media, then the penetration of
art and literature has never been more pervasive. As a matter of common
sense, these elements of pop culture must have some influence, perhaps a
large influence, on social norms. Indeed, the producers of pop culture often
deliberately set out to change or redirect social norms, including norms with
respect to speech. There can be little question that an increasingly
permissive approach to sex, violence, and language in television, motion
pictures, music, and literature over the past sixty years has had a significant
impact on social norms. Indeed, the process of declining social norms,
especially with respect to sexual matters, was cleverly satirized by Cole
07
Porter in 1934 in the immortal lyrics of Anything Goes.
Much of the development of norms is sub-conscious or reflexive,
however some of it is deliberate and rational. Indeed, norms of tolerance
permit the reasoned re-evaluation of existing norms.' With respect to the
boundaries of free speech, there has been significant reasoned debate.
Defenders of free speech have been able to rely on cogent arguments
developed by the likes of Milton, Mill, Holmes, Brandeis, Meiklejohn, and
others, bolstered by the inspiring rhetoric of such First Amendment classics
09 the Brandeis
as the Holmes dissent in United State v. Abrams,'
110 the Jackson opinion in West
concurrence in Whitney v. California,
VirginiaBoard ofEducation v. Barnette,"' and the Brennan opinion in New
York Times v. Sullivan.112 The reasoning is powerful, and even more so the
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"In olden days a glimpse of stocking
Was looked on as something shocking
But heaven knows
Anything goes
Good authors who too once knew better words
Now only use four letter words
Writing prose
Anything goes"

COLE PORTER, ANYTHING GOES (1934).

McAdams, supranote 94, at 397.
250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
"o 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
." 319 U.S. 624, 625 (1943).
112 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964).
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rhetoric. Those arguing for some restriction on free speech, especially with
respect to racist or sexist speech, have their rational arguments as well. In
response to the First Amendment, they raise constitutional counterarguments based on equality, as well as consideration of the victim's
perspective." 3 It is difficult to determine how much of a role rational
deliberation plays in the development and maintenance of social norms but
with respect to the boundaries of free speech, rational debate is not
irrelevant.
Perhaps more than anything, actual experience shapes social norms.
Most people internalize and conform to the norms of the societies or
cultures in which they live. Friends and family have a significant impact in
establishing or maintaining social norms that tend to govern a person's
speech and behavior.' 14 Those norms obviously come from somewhere.
They are developed over time based on the interaction of many of the
factors discussed above. However once in place, they exert a powerful
influence on members of the group. As a matter of everyday experience,
and as Mill recognized, people generally conform to the norms of society as
a means of achieving social acceptance."' Thus entrenched social norms
exert a powerful gravitational force. Mill recognized this and throughout his
career it continued to upset him.
Mill believed that existing social norms favored the status quo in most
matters, especially speech." 6 That is true almost as a matter of definition.
Existing social norms don't simply favor the status quo, rather, they are the
status quo. They represent a bulwark against the type of intellectual
eccentricity that Mill believed essential to the full development of critical
thinking.
Mill argued for a revision of what he perceived to be unduly censorial
social norms in order to promote greater freedom of speech and thought. He
was writing in a society that had struggled for greater tolerance of dissident
speech over the centuries. Milton's Areopagitica, published a full two
centuries prior to On Liberty, had struck a blow for toleration of speech (at
least that of Protestants).1' And over the next two centuries, as Mill
acknowledges, England had progressed toward greater tolerance of speech,
at least as a legal matter." 8 Even so, when Mill wrote England had no First

See Delgado, supra note 42, at 107.
Gibson, supra note 45, at 341.
us See MILL, supra note 1, at 126.
116 Id.
11
11

"
"

JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (Okitoks Press 2017) (1644).
MLL, supra note 1, at 86.
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Amendment nor an entrenched tradition of support for free speech. Indeed,
Mill was attempting to create just such a culture with On Liberty.
The United States, in the early twenty-first century finds itself in quite a
different position. Despite, a checkered history of intolerance of dissident
speech, the latter part of the twentieth century witnessed the development of
119
the most speech tolerant culture that the world has ever known. As has
often been recognized, the United States is a true outlier in the world with
20
This in turn presents
respect to the protection of offensive speech.'
favor the status
ordinarily
norms
something of a paradox. Although social
quo, perhaps in this unusual instance the status quo supports tolerance of
marginal and unconventional speech as opposed to its suppression. In other
words, in twenty-first century America, perhaps John Stuart Mill has
succeeded beyond his wildest dreams. The social norm is one of tolerance.
Perhaps the political correctness movement that started in the 1980s and
seems to have gathered steam more recently is best understood as a reaction
against the norm of tolerance. If so, the defenders of the free speech norm
find themselves in a different position than Mill did 150 years earlier. Mill
hoped to move the social norm with respect to the tolerance of
unconventional speech quite beyond where it had previously existed.
Current defenders of a vigorous free speech norm are attempting to preserve
what has already been achieved against a more restrictive counter
movement. This provides an advantage that Mill lacked in that it is
generally easier to defend the citadel than to attack it.
However, there is a further layer of complexity. To the extent that the
proponents of political correctness or social intolerance of speech have
made significant inroads in certain domains, such as academia, the
champions of free speech may quickly find that instead of defending an
established norm of tolerance, they are now challenging a recently
enshrined norm of restriction.' 2' Even so, the speech defenders still possess
an advantage that Mill lacked-a well-established legal and social tradition
of free speech tolerance including over a century of celebration of the
wisdom of John Stuart Mill.
Assuming that the defenders of relatively unrestricted speech and the
proponents of limiting hurtful speech, whether because it is racist, sexist,
homophobic, or simply insulting or insensitive, are currently locked in a
" See Chong, supranote 64, at 29 ("Since the 1950s, the overall trend in American politics and law
has been toward strengthening the norm of free speech.").
120

See WALKER, supra note 43, at 4-5.

Cf Chong, supra note 64, at 34 ("[O]utside the academy, there has been extensive criticism of
the new college culture, thus diluting and compromising the strength of the ideas emanating from that
source.").
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struggle over the legitimate boundaries of free speech, how should the
battle be fought?
Should the defenders of free speech culture necessarily object to any
social intolerance of speech? Of course not. As explained above, at least to
some extent, social intolerance is an acceptable form of counter-speech and
as such is deserving of respect and protection. Suppose that a speaker
makes a racist remark. One method of counter speech is to argue that the
very premise of the remark is wrong or misguided. Another response is to
declare: "That is an outrageous statement. It has no place in civilized
discourse and I will not tolerate it." Yet another is to simply turn one's back
on the speaker, walk away, and avoid further interaction with him or her.
The latter two responses would be examples of social intolerance. All three
responses would seem to fall within the ambit of freedom of speech. All are
intended to convey extreme disagreement with the speaker. The latter two
examples of social intolerance may be intended to silence the speaker. That
in itself seems inconsistent with a flourishing free speech culture. However,
the first example, arguing the merits of the speaker's premise, though
solidly within the legitimate domain of free speech, would also seem to
have the purpose and effect of silencing, at least in terms of convincing the
speaker that either his message or his manner of expressing it was
profoundly wrong and should not be repeated. A point of free speech, as
Mill argued, is to change minds, resulting in the rejection of previously held
opinions. If done effectively, it may ultimately result in silencing.
Still there would seem to be a difference between meeting disagreeable
speech squarely on the merits in an attempt to discredit it through open
debate as opposed to simply responding with outrage or social shunning
apparently designed to silence absent intellectual engagement. Although
either approach may legitimately claim to fall within the domain of free
speech, the former seems closer to its core while the latter straddles the
margins. The ideal marketplace of ideas, the market to which Mill was
devoted, assumes rational debate on the merits. The real marketplace as
Mill understood is far more vicious. Mill's hope as expressed at the
conclusion of his essay on free speech and thought was to move society,
however gradually, from the real toward the ideal.122 Likewise, if Mill was
correct that unrestrained speech is a pre-condition of free thought and
intellectual development, silencing through social intolerance seriously
undermines the value of critical thinking. Serious criticism or counterargument arguably forces the individual to reconsider his or her position.

122

See MILL, supra note 1, at 117.
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Mere social intolerance through shunning, marginalizing, or excluding the
speaker, however, could cause the speaker to reevaluate but certainly would
not provide an articulated reason for doing so. And as Mill believed, social
intolerance is more likely to result in unthinking social conformity, the very
123
General social
antithesis of the vibrant thinker that Mill cherished.
a legitimate
as
intolerance of disagreeable speech may claim to qualify
method of counter-speech, but just barely. It certainly is not the best means
of engaging the speaker.
Socially shunning offensive or disagreeable speech may be an
acceptable though unattractive alternative. Shouting down or disrupting the
124
The
speaker is not. It is entirely inconsistent with free speech values.
shunned speaker has at least had his say. If he is silenced, it is as an
exercise of his autonomy, though perhaps coerced by social pressure. The
speaker who is prevented from speaking by the so-called heckler's veto has
never been given the opportunity to speak. His ideas have not found their
way into the marketplace. He has not been allowed the opportunity to
articulate his views. And though it is at least possible that angry shouts of
disapproval may cause the speaker to re-evaluate his own views, the
likelihood is small and the cost to free speech values is simply too great.
Although the heckler's veto should be beyond the pale of acceptable
speech, heckling alone should not be. Heckling, that is aggressive verbal
disagreement during the course of a speech, is a part of our free speech
tradition. Heckling after all is counter-speech; outside of the Robert's Rules
of Order to be sure, yet still very effective. One need only watch a debate in
the House of Commons to appreciate the power and value of heckling. Mill
emphasized that a core function of free speech is to promote constant reevaluation of ideas and opinions. Critical counter-speech serves the
function of illuminating error in argument. Skillful heckling of a superficial
or illogical speech can be an effective method of illuminating the flaws in
an argument. Of course not all heckling is skillful. Much of it is boorish and
vulgar. But not all speech is enlightening either. Most isn't. But the
legitimacy of speech or counter-speech does not depend on its cogency. A
distinction should be drawn between heckling that shuts down a speaker
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See id at 101 )2.
See Updated Statement on Violent Protest at University of California, Berkely, FOUND. FOR

INDIVIDUAL RTS. IN EDUC. (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.thefire.org/updated-statement-on-violentprotest-at-university-of-california-berkely/ (condemning the riot at the University of California,
Berkeley that forced cancellation of a speech by Milo Yiannopoulos). See also David Bromwich, The
New Campus Censors, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 17, 2017, for a discussion of disruption of
speakers on campus.
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and that which does not. The former is beyond the pale while the latter is
not.
In confronting the real marketplace of ideas, should social intolerance
designed primarily if not exclusively to silence speech be accepted as a
legitimate part of the debate, or should it be condemned as antithetical to
the values of free speech? The answer may to some extent depend on
perspective.
From the perspective of the socially intolerant, such behavior may be
characterized as aggressive counter-speech, a means of decisive reply to an
arguably offensive message. The socially intolerant are still competing in
the marketplace, they are simply competing hard and playing to win.
Silencing the opposition is simply one method of winning the debate. From
the perspective of society, it may appear different. One dominant social
value protected by the marketplace of ideas is to make progress towards
discovering the truth through the clash of ideas both socially and
individually. Mill argued that most ideas are but half-truths and it is only
through consideration of all perspectives that the whole truth emerges.12 5 By
silencing speech, social intolerance inevitably suppresses some truth, or as
Mill would have it at least some half-truth. This necessarily undermines the
proper functioning of the marketplace of ideas.
From the perspective of the potential speaker, the harm would appear to
be even greater. As Mill explained, social intolerance of speech inhibits the
speaker both with respect to speech and thought.' 2 6 A pall is cast over the
entire intellectual enterprise. The speaker ceases to speak and the thinker
ceases to think. There is no intellectual growth. From Mill's perspective,
this was clearly the most serious consequence of social intolerance. This is
why Mill suggested that social intolerance is as, if not more, destructive
than legal prohibition. 127
So assuming that at least sometimes social intolerance of speech is
socially beneficial, both by silencing at least some speech that probably
should be silenced and as a somewhat legitimate means of responding to
disagreeable speech, can it be contained in such a way that it does not
undermine the important values of free speech by casting a pall of
orthodoxy over the marketplace of ideas? Perhaps the greatest difficulties
with any regulation of speech, legal or social, are the inter-related concepts
of over breadth and the chilling effect. Assuming that some speech ought to
be silenced, there is a legitimate fear that any regulatory system will cover

25
126
127

See MILL, supra note 1, at 121-22.

Id. at 100-01.
See id at 101-02.
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28
speech that should not be silenced. That is the over breadth problem.1 in
addition, even if regulation is not intended to reach protected speech, the
concept of the chilling effect assumes that potential speakers will be fearful
of prohibitions (legal or social) and through self-censorship relinquish the
29
In the context of legal
right to engage in non-prohibited speech.'
prohibition of speech, courts can tailor permissible regulation to avoid the
pitfalls of over breadth and the chilling effect. In the case of social
regulation however, social and cultural norms must replace judicial
protection. Obviously, this is a rather extreme challenge.
If a society is to avoid the detrimental impact of self-censorship induced
by social intolerance, it must develop and nurture a vigorous free speech
culture. That does not mean that there are no boundaries. Of course there
are. Personally insulting or demeaning speech, though not legally
prohibited, can legitimately be met with vigorous social intolerance. In a
particular context, there may be other examples as well. However, there
should be clear recognition of the tendency to continually expand the
domain of socially prohibited speech to include that speech which is simply
inconsistent with the values, beliefs, and opinions of the majority or of
some influential segment of the population. A social norm excluding racial
epithets from the domain of acceptable speech could unfortunately expand
to prohibit criticism of race-based affirmative action. A norm to exclude
sexist insults might expand to prohibit criticism of progressive abortion
policies or women's aptitude for STEM subjects. A norm excluding insults
based on sexual orientation might readily be applied to criticism of samesex marriage. Indeed, an examination of the enforcement of speech codes
on college campuses reveals that all this and much more has occurred.o
As such, there should be automatic suspicion of any attempt to exercise
social intolerance against harmful speech out of legitimate fear that it has
either the purpose or effect of suppressing that which should be spoken.
That is not to say that social intolerance is always improper, but rather that
it always carries the burden ofjustification.
Yet another lesson learned from the legal domain is that intolerance of
specific viewpoints, however loathsome they may be, is simply inconsistent
with a free speech culture. Viewpoint discrimination is a prohibited manner
of legal regulation.' 3 ' If the value of free speech as expounded by Mill is to
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See, e.g, Bd. of Airport Comm'rs. v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987).

129 See Frederick Schauer, Fear Risk and the FirstAnendment: Unraveling the Chilling Effect, 58

B.U. L. REv. 685, 689 (1978).
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be realized, no opinion, including racist and sexist opinions, should be
banned. As Mill argued, wrong-headed opinions contribute to "the clearer
perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with
error."l 32 In addition, however true an opinion or idea may be, "if it is not
fully, fearlessly and frequently discussed, it will be held as dead dogma, not
a living truth."'3 3
Assuming that freedom of speech is extremely valuable both to the
individual and to society, and that social intolerance, though sometimes a
legitimate part of the domain of freedom of speech, nevertheless often
undermines free speech and its values by casting a pall of orthodoxy, can
free speech and its values be vindicated? That is, can the defenders of free
speech hold their own or even gain ground in the struggle over what is
acceptable speech? The answer is yes, but if and only if the defenders of
free speech have the courage and persistence to continually defend the
value of free speech against constant challenge. As discussed above, there is
a struggle over the location of the boundaries of social norms regarding
acceptable speech. Those who would restrict free speech raise arguments of
equality, decency, inclusion, and freedom from offense, degradation, and
emotional distress. These are sympathetic values worthy of protection.
However, throughout history, attempts to restrict freedom of speech have
been based on the preservation of admirable social and cultural values. As
always, the case for relatively unrestricted speech must emphasize that it is
worth preserving even at the cost of the infliction of some social harm. Free
speech is not costless, however the cost is worth the value. If a free speech
norm is to be successfully defended, it must have prominent, outspoken,
aggressive, and well organized advocates. In recent decades people such as
Nat Hentoff, Alan Dershowitz, Lee Bollinger, Ahyeh Neir, Ira Glasser, Jay
Sekulow, Floyd Abrams, Greg Lukianoff, and many others have answered
the call time and again. Organizations such as the American Civil Liberties
Union, the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE), the
Alliance Defense Fund, the American Center for Law and Justice (ACLJ),
the Rutherford Institute, and the First Amendment Center at Vanderbilt
University continue to fight for freedom of speech. As noted above,
leadership plays a significant role in the development and maintenance of
social norms. But so does education and, unfortunately, educational
institutions and their leaders have often been responsible for creating a
culture in which freedom of speech is unduly restricted. But that is not
always the case. The examples of Benno Schmidt, C. Van Woodward, and
377, 391 (1992).
132 See MILL, supra note 1, at 87.
133 Id. at 103.
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Donald Kagan at Yale,134 Lee Bollinger at Columbia,' Alan Dershowitz at
Harvard,1 36 and Geoffrey Stone and Robert Zimmer at the University of
Chicago,13 1 to mention a few of the most prominent, have provided a
significant boost for freedom of speech in academia.
The advocates of freedom of speech enjoy the benefit of a remarkable
tradition of free speech theory, rhetoric, and judicial triumph. As important
as this tradition is in laying the foundation for speech protective social
norms, it is not a part of the atmosphere. Rather, it must be taught and retaught. Noted free speech advocate Nat Hentoff was fond of quoting Ronald
Reagan's statement that "if we forget what we did, we won't know who we
" 3 It is all too easy to take free speech for granted. Many don't.
are .
The stories of the great free speech struggles and victories such as West
40
39
Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,1 New York Times v. Sullivan,1
42
Cohen v. California,14 ' and Texas v. Johnson,1 jUSt to name a few, must be
told and retold if they are to continue to resonate and influence.
In many areas, reasoned argument plays little role in the adjustment of
social norms. However, freedom of speech is an area in which cogent
argument can make a difference. Speech theorists have been devising and
debating arguments as to why free speech matters for centuries. Arguably,
John Stuart Mill stands atop the pyramid with Holmes, Brandeis, Hand, and
Meiklejohn not far behind. In the latter half of the twentieth century, free
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speech theory has been eloquently propounded by Harry Kalven,1 4 3 Thomas
Emerson,'" Vince Blasi,145 Lee Bollinger,146 Fred Schauer,1 47 Geoffrey
Stone, 148 Ed Baker, 149 Steve Shiffren,so and Kent Greenawalt,'5 1 simply to
mention a few. The arguments that these scholars have produced are cogent
and powerful. They should be circulated more widely, although often in a
more simplified and accessible form. If reasoned argument can influence
the establishment and defense of social norms, and in this instance it
certainly can, the foundation has been carefully laid.
III. CONCLUSION
As Nat Hentoff has proclaimed, "censorship . . . remains the strongest
drive in human nature, with sex a weak second."l5 2 Attempts to restrict
freedom of speech both legally and socially are constant and pervasive. The
relatively liberal norms of free speech which took hold in the United States
in the latter half of the twentieth century can be maintained only through
vigorous action by the defenders of speech.
It may seem idealistic if not downright foolish to attempt to influence
the boundaries of a domain that by definition is impervious to regulation.
However, freedom of speech is a social and cultural institution (using the
term very loosely) that is not immune to social and cultural norms. The
creation and defense of those norms, and the definition of the boundaries, is
a process that occurs to a large degree within the domain of free speech
itself. As long as there are those who agree with Mill that freedom of
speech is extraordinarily valuable and that social intolerance presents a
serious threat to its health and existence, there will be efforts to push back
against intolerance of controversial speech and to make the case vigorously
and often for a largely unrestrained marketplace of ideas. Mill was one man
(though an unusually articulate and intelligent man). Yet as history's
preeminent defender of free speech, the impact that he has had is
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incalculable. Close to one hundred and fifty years after its publication, On
Liberty remains required reading. As long as Mill has disciples with the
courage, and it often takes courage, to defend the value of free speech,
social intolerance of speech can be held at bay.

